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Dirty deeds and dirty bodies: 
Embodiment of the Macbeth effect 
is mapped topographically onto the 
somatosensory cortex
Michael Schaefer1, Michael Rotte1, Hans-Jochen Heinze1 & Claudia Denke2
The theory of embodied cognition claims that knowledge is represented in modal systems derived from 
perception. Recent behavioral studies found evidence for this hypothesis, for example, by linking moral 
purity with physical cleansing (the Macbeth effect). Neurophysiological approaches provided further 
support by showing an involvement of sensorimotor cortices for embodied metaphors. However, the 
exact role of this brain region for embodied cognitions remains to be cleared. Here we demonstrate 
that the involvement of the sensorimotor cortex for the embodied metaphor of moral-purity is 
somatotopically organized. Participants enacted in scenarios where they had to perform immoral or 
moral acts either with their mouths or their hands. Results showed that mouthwash products were 
particularly desirable after lying in a voice mail and hand wash products were particularly desirable 
after writing a lie, thus demonstrating that the moral-purity metaphor is specific to the sensorimotor 
modality involved in earlier immoral behavior. FMRI results of this interaction showed activation in 
sensorimotor cortices during the evaluation phase that was somatotopically organized with respect to 
preceding lying in a voice mail (mouth-area) or in a written note (hand-area). Thus, the results provide 
evidence for a central role of the sensorimotor cortices for embodied metaphors.
When thinking about religious ceremonies a close relationship between moral transgressions and physical cleanli-
ness is well known. For example, baptism is an essential part of Roman Catholic, Protestantism and other churches. 
Or think about the rule to clean yourself before entering a mosque. Another example is the use of holy water 
to bless oneself in Roman Catholic churches. In the last years psychological experiments investigated this link 
systematically. Experiments by Zhong and Liljenquist1 revealed that hand washing removes the guilt of past mis-
deeds. For example, one of their experiments showed that copying an unethical story increased the desirability of 
cleansing products as compared to copying an ethical story1,2. In addition, Schnall et al.3 reported that cleaning 
products soften one’s judgment of others’ misdeeds. Furthermore, hand washing also seems to reduce postdeci-
sional dissonance4.
So why does hand washing remove more than dirt? The results may be explained by the conceptual metaphor 
theory, which suggests that many constructs in social cognition are metaphorical5. According to this theory of 
embodiment cognitive representations are structured by metaphorical mappings from sensory experience. Thus, 
abstract thoughts about morality may be grounded in concrete experiences of physical cleanliness2,5. Numerous 
studies provide support for the theory of embodied cognition. For example, Williams and Bargh6 demonstrated 
that experiencing physical warmth, e.g., holding a cup of hot (versus iced) coffee, make it likely to judge a person 
as having a “warm” personality. Ackerman et al.7 showed that basic tactile sensations have an impact on higher 
social cognitive processing in dimension- and metaphor-specific ways. Hence, holding a heavy clipboard made 
job candidates appear more important7,8.
Only very recently studies using neuroimaging approaches tried to unravel the neural underpinnings of embod-
ied metaphors. Kang et al.9 employed fMRI to examine effects of physical temperature on trust behavior and found 
activation in bilateral anterior insula, central operculum, and primary somatosensory cortex (SI) associated with 
the embodied metaphor of warmth. Desai et al.10 compared neural responses to literal and metaphoric action 
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and found activity in left anterior inferior parietal lobe, suggesting that the understanding of a metaphoric action 
retains a link to sensory-motor systems engaged in action performance. Lacey et al.11 examined textural metaphors 
and reported activation of texture-selective-somatosensory cortex in the parietal operculum. Saxbe et al.12 exam-
ined language use during the feeling of social emotions and found somatosensory activity linked with complex 
social emotional processing. Our previous study examined the metaphor roughness and showed that rough tactile 
priming made social interactions appear more difficult and adversarial, consistent with the rough metaphor. This 
effect was accompanied with a cortical network including in particular the somatosensory cortices13, (see also14).
In accordance with the assumptions of the theory of embodied cognition the above-mentioned studies found an 
involvement of sensorimotor brain areas when examining the neural correlates of embodied metaphors. However, 
the exact role of the sensorimotor cortices for embodied cognitions remains to be cleared.
A recent experiment by Lee and Schwarz2 offers the opportunity to characterize the role of the sensorimotor 
cortices for embodied metaphors more in detail. Lee and Schwarz2 point out that natural language use associates 
the moral-purity metaphor with specific body parts, e.g., “dirty hands” or “dirty mouth”. In a behavioral experiment 
the authors showed that people prefer purification of the “dirty” body part of other body parts. They conclude that 
the embodiment of the moral-purity metaphor is specific to the motor modality involved in moral transgression. 
The present study made use of this effect in order to determine the role of the sensorimotor cortices for embodied 
cognitions. Given that there is a well known functional topography in SI and primary motor cortex (M1) (also 
described as the somatosensory homunculus), we hypothesized that the preference for purification of the “dirty” 
body part is reflected in a somatotopical activation of the sensorimotor cortex. If the moral-purity metaphor is 
mapped topographically on SI (and M1), this result would provide strong support for the theory of embodiment 
and for a fundamental role of the sensorimotor cortices for embodied or grounded cognitions.
In order to test our hypothesis if embodiment is sensitive to motor modality we adopted the paradigm of Lee 
and Schwarz2 for an fMRI experiment. While scanning brain activity participants had to enact scenarios and 
behave either ethical (telling the truth) or not ethical (lying). This was done either by hand (writing) or by mouth 
(speaking). Subsequent assessments of the desirability should evoke increased ratings for hand wash or toothpaste 
and mouthwash products, depending on the previous modality of moral transgressions. We hypothesized that 
these preferences in purification were accompanied by an engagement of the hand- or mouth area in sensorimotor 
cortex, respectively.
Materials and Methods
Participants. 35 people (17 females) with a mean age of 25 years (± 3.77, range 20–35 years) took part in the 
study. All participants were right-handed native German volunteers with no neurological or psychiatric history. 
The participants gave written informed consent to the study, which adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki and 
was approved by the local human subjects’ committee.
Procedure. Participants were told that they would perform two separate experiments in the fMRI scanner. 
The first one was described as a cognitive neuroscience experiment. The second one was introduced as not linked 
to the previous one and having a marketing background. All participants were naive to the real aim of the study. 
At the end of the experiment participants were probed for suspicions about the experiment’s true purpose.
The study consisted out of a three-factorial experimental design. The first factor was ethicality (ethical or 
unethical behavior). The second factor described the modality (writing a note with the hand (hand) or leaving a 
voicemail (mouth)). The third factor was the set of products participants had to rate with respect to the desirability 
(toothpaste and mouthwash products vs. hand soaps).
While lying in the fMRI participants enacted short scenarios modeled analogue to Zhong and Liljenquist1 and 
Lee and Schwarz2. For example, participants read the following scenario: “Imagine you are a law-firm associate 
competing for promotion with a colleague Sven. Today in the morning you found an important document on the 
floor by accident, which has obviously been lost by your colleague Sven. Returning this document to Chris would 
be very important for Sven, but might hurt your own career.” After 18 seconds a new screen showed up, instructing 
the participant to leave Sven a voice mail (mouth condition) or a note with a pencil on a paper (hand condition). 
In the unethical voice mail condition (mouth condition) the participant was prompted with the following screen: 
“Please leave a voice mail for Sven. Tell him who you are and that you did not find his document. Please speak 
now!”. In the ethical voicemail condition (telling the truth) the participant was prompted with this instruction: 
“Please leave a voice mail for Sven. Tell him who you are and that you did find the document. Please speak now!” 
In the hand condition the participants were faced with the following instructions (ethical): “Please leave a note 
for Sven. Write him that you did not find his document and sign the note. Start now!”. For the ethical condition 
the instruction was like this: “Please leave a note for Sven. Write him that you did find his document and sign the 
note. Start now!”.
The participants had 17 seconds to perform this task. Then a new screen showed up asking the participants 
to rate the following products on a four-point scale (Likert-scale, 1 = completely undesirable, 4 = completely 
desirable). After 2.5 seconds two pictures of products were shown, each lasting for 4 seconds with an interstimulus 
interval of 9 seconds. Thus, the participants had 13 seconds to rate each of the products (earlier responding did 
not automatically start the next trial). One of the pictures was taken out of a category of hand soap products, the 
other picture belonged to a category of toothpastes and mouthwash products.
Participants were required to press buttons with their right hand using a key with four buttons (ranging from 
+ 2 to − 2) to assess the products. Before the experiment they were explained that they could weight their responses 
from moderate (inner buttons) to extreme (outer buttons). Participants were made familiar with both tasks before 
beginning of the experiment.
The experiment consisted out of a total of 60 scenarios. Each scenario was repeated two times, followed by 
either the instruction to convey a malevolent or the instruction to give a benevolent message. Half of the scenarios 
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included the instruction to leave a written message, the other half asked the participants to leave a message on 
the voice mail. The order of presentation of the two product categories (first or second place) was randomized. 
Furthermore, the products for each category were randomized over all conditions (within and between subjects). 
Products were chosen as equally attractive in a pre-study. Participants were told that the voice messages inside the 
scanner were recorded for later analysis. In fact we did not record these messages.
Visual images were back-projected to a screen at the end of the scanner bed close to the subject’s feet. Subjects 
viewed the images through a mirror mounted on the birdcage of the receiving coil. Foam cushions were placed 
tightly around the side of the subject’s head to minimize head motion.
The experiment consisted out of six runs, each lasting for about 12 minutes and including all conditions. 
Participants were allowed to take short breaks between the runs. All data were tested for normality of distribution 
and possible outliers15.
FMRI Data Acquisition and Analysis. Data acquisition was done on a 3 T scanner (Siemens MAGNETOM 
Trio, Germany). T2-weighted functional images were acquired using gradient echo-planar images (TR = 2 sec, 
TE = 35 ms, flip angle = 80 degrees, FOV = 224 mm). For each subject, data were acquired in six runs. In each 
session, 404 volumes were acquired. Functional volumes consisted of 32 slices. Each volume comprised 3.5 mm 
slices (no gap, in plane voxel size 3.5 × 3.5 mm). For anatomic reference a high-resolution T1-weighted structural 
image was acquired using an MP-RAGE sequence (TR = 1650 ms, TE = 5 ms).
Image preprocessing and analysis was performed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping Software (SPM8, 
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK). Individual functional 
images were realigned to correct for inter-scan movement using sinc interpolation and subsequently normalized 
into a standard anatomical space (MNI, Montreal Neurological Institute template) resulting in isotropic 3 mm 
voxels. Data were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full-width half maximum.
We then computed statistical parametric maps by using multiple regressions with the hemodynamic response 
function modeled in SPM8. Data analyses were performed at two levels. First, we examined data on the individual 
subject level by using a fixed effects model. Second, the resulting parameter estimates for each regressor at each 
voxel were entered into a second-level analysis with the random effects model. In order to examine responses in 
sensorimotor brain areas when participants perform the (un) ethical task we calculated statistical contrasts (t-tests) 
for the time window while speaking relative to rest and writing relative to rest, respectively. In order to examine 
brain responses while assessing the products we examined the time window while evaluating the desirability of 
the products. We computed an ANOVA for repeated measurements with the factors previous ethical behavior 
(moral vs. immoral), set of products (toothpaste and mouthwash vs. hand soaps), and modality (hand vs. mouth). 
Statistical contrasts (t tests) were then performed to examine cortical activation associated with moral and immoral 
behavior for the different set of products and different modalities. In order to test our hypothesis that sensorimotor 
brain regions subserve the embodiment of the moral-purity metaphor in a topographic way, we masked these 
effects with results of the speaking and writing task, respectively.
Parameter estimates for voxels in the sensorimotor regions of interest (maximum peaks in SI and M1) were 
tested for possible correlations (Pearson) with behavioral responses (bias in rating of products). In addition to 
those brain areas we also tested possible correlations with BA6, hippocampus, and amygdala, since previous studies 
found additional activation in these regions (e.g.,13).
We report activations that survived a threshold of p < 0.05, family-wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple 
comparisons. Correction was achieved by imposing a threshold for the volume of clusters comprising contiguous 
voxels that passed a voxel-wised threshold of p < 0.005. Anatomical interpretation of the functional imaging results 
was performed by using the SPM anatomy toolbox16.
Results
Behavioral results. None of the participants reported any suspicions with respect to our experimental 
hypotheses when being asked at the end of the experiment.
An ANOVA with factors set of products, modality and ethics revealed a significant three-way interaction 
(F (1,34) = 4.82, p = 0.03, no other significant effects). Post hoc t-tests demonstrated that participants evaluated 
toothpaste and mouthwash products more positively after lying in a voicemail than after lying in a written note 
(voicemail: mean 2.56, standard deviation ± 0.53; written note: 2.48 ± 0.50; t(34) = 2.63, p = 0.006). Thus, tooth-
paste and mouthwash products were evaluated more positively only after lying in a voicemail (not after lying 
in a written note). Lying in a written note resulted in higher assessments for hand soaps compared with lying 
in a voicemail, but this difference failed to reach the level of significance (written note: 2.54, ± 0.43; voice mail: 
2.51 ± 0.48; t(34) = 0.15, p = 0.26) (see Fig. 1). Analogue comparisons for evaluations after ethical behavior revealed 
no significant differences (all p > 0.10).
Furthermore, post hoc t-tests successfully replicated the Macbeth effect for both modalities (see Fig. 1). Thus, 
toothpaste and mouthwash products were evaluated more positively after lying compared with telling the truth in 
a voicemail (t(34) = 2.44, p = 0.01). In an analogue way, hand soap products were assessed more positively after 
lying relative to telling the truth in a written message (t(34) = 2.03, p = 0.02).
Analysis of the reaction times revealed no significant results.
FMRI results: Brain responses while leaving a lie on a voicemail and as a written note. Brain 
responses when leaving a lie on a written note relative to rest revealed activations in left sensorimotor cortex, 
premotor brain areas, inferior frontal gyrus (BA44), right postcentral gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, right insula, 
inferior parietal cortex, superior parietal lobe, and occipital cortex. Leaving a lie as a voicemail was accompanied 
with activations in sensorimotor cortices, premotor cortex (BA44), superior parietal lobe (precuneus), and occip-
ital cortex (at p < 0.05, FWE corrected). Comparing brain responses for writing relative to leaving a voicemail 
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revealed more dorsal activation of sensorimotor brain regions than the contrast leaving a voicemail relative to 
writing, as expected (in line with the topography of the homunculus, see Fig. 2).
FMRI results: Brain responses while evaluating products after lying in a voicemail. Results of the 
ANOVA (factors ethics, set of products and modality) revealed an interaction between the three factors, including 
activation of a cluster involving sensorimotor and premotor cortex (BA6), precuneus, anterior cingulate cortex, 
hippocampus, and occipital cortex. We then calculated brain responses after lying in a voicemail while evaluating 
different products (post-hoc t-tests). Comparing brain activations after lying relative to telling the truth (the 
Macbeth effect) for toothpaste and mouthwash products revealed activity in left sensorimotor and premotor cortex 
(masked with the contrast mouth-rest). The unmasked contrast revealed additional activation in right prefrontal 
gyrus and precuneus (MNI coordinates: 24 58 4, z = 4.25; − 8 − 82 50, z = 4.39; FWE corrected). As a further 
control condition we calculated brain responses for the same contrast, but masked with the contrast hand-rest. As 
expected, results revealed no significant voxels. The reverse contrast for telling the truth relative to lying revealed 
no significant activation (masked and unmasked). Furthermore, the analogue contrast lying relative to telling 
the truth (the Macbeth effect) for assessing hand wash products failed to reveal activity in sensorimotor cor-
tex (masked with contrast mouth-rest). Unmasked results revealed activity in anterior cingulate cortex (− 10 30 
20, z = 6.35), bilateral insula (− 30 14 − 16, z = 5.75; 40 8 − 6, z = 5.48), and inferior parietal lobe (58 − 36 46, 
z = 4.98), but no activation of sensorimotor brain areas (see Table 1 and Fig. 3).
Figure 1. (A) Participants’ mean evaluation (+ standard errors) of cleansing products after unethical 
(lying) acts (leaving a lie on a voicemail or lying in a written note). After lying in a voicemail toothpaste and 
mouthwash products were evaluated more positively than after lying in a written note. Analogue comparisons 
for evaluations after ethical behavior revealed no significant differences (all p > 0.10). (B) Participants’ mean 
evaluation of cleansing products after unethical (lying) or ethical acts (telling the truth). Cleansing products 
(toothpaste and mouthwash products as well as hand wash products) were evaluated significantly higher when 
participants performed an unethical deed before (the Macbeth effect).
Figure 2. Statistical maps showing brain activation while participants were leaving a lie on a voicemail 
and while writing a lie on a note (relative to rest). Areas of significant fMRI signal change are shown as color 
overlays on the T1-MNI reference brain (FWE corrected at p > 0.05).
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Thus, previous lying in a voicemail resulted in sensorimotor engagement when subsequently evaluating mouth-
wash and toothpaste products, but not when rating hand wash products. This sensorimotor engagement was 
similar to the activity while performing the lying (mouth region of topography in sensorimotor cortex) (see Fig. 4).
We then compared the effect of lying in a voice mail on the factor set of products. Results revealed involve-
ment of left sensorimotor cortex when participants were evaluating toothpaste and mouthwash products, but no 
significant activation when they were rating soap products (unmasked results, FWE corrected, see Table 2 and 
Fig. 5). We concluded that the Macbeth effect after speaking a lie worked for toothpaste and mouthwash products, 
but not for hand soap products.
Figure 6 displays a correlation between brain activations with signal changes in sensorimotor peak areas (SI and M1) 
associated with ratings for toothpaste and mouthwash products relative to hand wash products after lying in 
a voicemail and behavioral responses. Results demonstrate a significant positive correlation of r = 0.39 for SI 
(p = 0.02, Pearson, two-sided). The correlation for M1 failed to reach the level of significance (r = 0.28, p = 0.11). 
There were no other significant correlations (for example, with the premotor cortex). Furthermore, there were no 
significant correlations of reaction times with regions of interest.
FMRI results: Brain responses while evaluating products after lying in a written note. We then 
examined brain responses after lying in a written message while assessing products. Lying relative to writing the 
truth revealed activation in bilateral somatosensory cortex, right premotor cortex (BA6) and BA44 (masked, 
unmasked analysis revealed no additional results) when participants assessed hand soap products. As a further 
control condition we calculated brain responses for the same contrast, but masked with the contrast mouth-rest. 
As expected, results revealed no significant voxels. When assessing toothpaste and mouthwash products (after 
lying in a written message), results revealed no significant results (masked and unmasked) (see Table 3 and Fig. 3).
The opposite contrasts (ethical relative to unethical) failed to reveal significant activations (masked und 
unmasked) both for assessing mouthwash and hand soap products (after lying in a written note).
Hence, the results showed that immoral acts performed with the hand (writing a note) resulted in sensorimo-
tor activation only when participants rated hand wash products, not when being asked to judge toothpaste and 
mouthwash products. This sensorimotor activation was in a similar brain region compared with the brain activity 
while performing the writing (the hand area of the sensorimotor topography, see Fig. 4).
We then compared the effect of lying in a written message on the factor set of products. Results revealed 
stronger activation of sensorimotor cortex (including SI, M1, premotor cortex), hippocampus, and occipital cortex 
when participants judged hand wash products compared with toothpaste and mouthwash products. The reverse 
contrast revealed no significant activations (see Table 2 and Figs 4 and 5). Thus, the Macbeth effect after writing a 
malevolent message worked for hand wash products, but not for toothpaste and mouthwash products. However, 
we did not find a significant correlation between signal changes in sensorimotor peak areas (SI and M1, associated 
with ratings for hand wash products relative to toothpaste and mouthwash products after lying in a written mail) 
with behavioral responses (p > 0.10, Pearson, two-sided). This can be explained by the only small differences for 
this contrast in the behavioral data, which failed to reach the level of significance (see above in behavioral results).
There were no other significant correlations. Furthermore, there were no significant correlations of reaction 
times with regions of interest.
Discussion
The theory of embodied cognition makes clear assumptions of an interaction between body and mind. The current 
study aimed to test these assumptions by examining neural mechanisms that underlie embodied knowledge. In 
particular, we aimed to determine the role of the sensorimotor cortices in the moral-purity metaphor. In line with 
previous studies we report that people find purification of the “dirty” body part more desirable than purification of 
other body parts, thus demonstrating that moral purity is specific to the sensorimotor modality involved in moral 
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in a voicemail
L SI/premotor cortex(BA6) 
(L sup. temporal gyrus)  
(R sup. temporal gyrus)  
(L hippocampus/amygdala) 
occipital cortex/cerebellum
− 36 − 18 32 
− 46 − 26 − 2 
62 − 18 − 2 
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after telling the 
truth > after lying 
in a voicemail




after lying > after 
telling the truth 
in a voicemail
— — — —
after telling the 
truth > after lying 
in a voicemail
— — — —
Table 1.  Results of random effects analysis for brain responses when rating different set of products. 
Displayed are activations surviving cluster level correction (p < 0.05, FWE corrected, threshold of p < 0.005 
used to define the clusters, masked with speaking task results, L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere; in 
brackets: uncorrected results).
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that this interaction was associated with activation especially in the somatosensory cortices (SI). This engagement of 
SI was somatotopically organized, thus activating mouth areas while evaluating products after lying in a voicemail 
(but only for toothpaste and mouthwash products) and hand areas after lying in a written note (but only for hand 
wash products). In addition, the hand area in SI was not recruited for the verbal condition and the mouth area 
not for the hand condition, thus demonstrating a somatotopic specifity and a double dissociation of the effects.
The theory of embodiment argues that cognition is deeply rooted in sensory experiences. According to this 
theory social cognitions (e.g., the moral appropriateness of actions) are strongly based on bodily sensations17. 
Numerous behavioral studies confirm the theory of embodied cognitions (e.g.,7,18). Studies using neuroimaging 
approaches offer the chance to provide additional support by showing potential engagement of sensorimotor brain 
areas involved in embodied cognitions, which could proof the assumptions of the theory in a direct way.
Figure 3. Statistical maps showing brain activation while participants had to evaluate hand soaps and 
toothpaste and mouthwash products. See text for details. Areas of significant fMRI signal change are shown as 
color overlays on the T1-MNI reference brain (FWE corrected at p > 0.05).
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Several studies employing fMRI report an involvement of somatosensory brain areas, in particular SI, when 
examining neural correlates of embodied metaphors. The current study is the first one demonstrating that meta-
phors are topographically reflected in the somatosensory homunculus, thus providing strong support for the theory 
of embodiment in general as well as for a fundamental role of SI in this theory in particular.
Our behavior results confirmed the study by Lee and Schwarz2 in a with-in subjects design. First, we replicated 
the Macbeth effect for both modalities. Thus, evaluations of purification goods were higher after lying relative to 
telling the truth, for both modalities. These results are in line with the ones reported by Zhong and Liljenquist1 
(see also14). Second, participants preferred purification of the “dirty” body part over purification of other body 
parts, thus confirming the results of Lee and Schwarz2. Hence, toothpaste and mouthwash products were evaluated 
more positively after lying in a voicemail but not after lying in a written note, demonstrating that embodiment is 
sensitive to motor modality. However, hand wash products seem to wash away the sins both for lying in a voicemail 
as well as for lying in a written message. This result differs from Lee and Schwarz2. Nevertheless, Lee and Schwarz2 
used slightly different products (mouthwash and hand sanitizer). In addition, they used a between-subjects-design 
with a higher number of participants. Last, participants of our study had another cultural background. One or a 
combination of these points might explain the lack of specifity in the hand modality in our study.
Analysis of our fMRI data confirmed our behavioral results. The Macbeth effect for the hand modality (lying 
vs. telling the truth in a written note) was accompanied with activation in sensorimotor brain areas including SI, 
BA6 and BA44. These brain regions were engaged after immoral relative to moral acts, but only when assessing 
hand wash products, not when evaluating toothpaste and mouthwash products (thus extending the behavioral 
results, which failed to find a significant difference here, see previous paragraph). Similarly, the Macbeth effect 
for the mouth modality (lying vs. telling the truth in a voicemail) was associated with activity in SI and premotor 
cortex. Again, these brain regions were engaged after immoral relative to moral deeds, but here only when assess-
ing toothpaste and mouthwash products, not when judging the desirability of hand wash products. Thus, neural 
correlates of the embodied moral-purity metaphor rely on sensorimotor brain regions, in particular SI. This is in 
line with previous studies investigating other embodied metaphors (e.g.,11,13,14).
Moreover, SI was differentially involved depending on the modality of lying. Thus, lying in a written note 
resulted in more dorsal activation of the somatosensory homunculus when assessing the hand wash products. This 
more dorsal activation was in line with the activation of SI during the writing task (the hand area of the homun-
culus). In contrast, lying in a voicemail resulted in a more inferior activation of the somatosensory map, similar 
Figure 4. (A) Overlap (in violet) of brain activation while actually writing a lie (relative to rest, in red) with 
brain areas involved when participants had to evaluate hand soap products after writing a lie on a note (relative 
to telling the truth, in blue). (B) Same for the mouth modality (speaking a lie and assessment of toothpaste and 
mouthwash products).
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to the activation of SI during the lying (speaking) task (the mouth area of the homunculus). We conclude that the 
results confirm the hypothesis that embodiment is sensitive to modality and that the neural underpinnings of this 
sensitivity are reflected in the somatotopical map in SI.
While previous studies already documented a role for somatosensory brain regions, in particular SI, for embod-
ied metaphors (e.g.,9,11–14), the present study demonstrates for the first time a functional topographical dissociation 
of activity in SI depending on the modality used in moral transgression. Hence, SI seems to maintain a central 
role for embodied metaphors. This role for SI in embodied metaphors is in line with other studies showing an 
involvement of somatosensory brain areas in social cognitions. Whereas classic studies understood this body map 
representation in SI as fix and reflecting the physical location of peripheral stimulation in the form of the famous 
somatosensory homunculus, recent studies challenge this view and suggest a more complex role for SI. For exam-
ple, numerous studies suggest that the somatosensory cortices are engaged in social perceptions, in particular to 
empathy (e.g.,19,20). Furthermore, mirror-like activations in somatosensory cortices when observing others being 
touched have been reported21. These mirror-like activations in the somatosensory cortices have been shown to 
be linked with the empathic abilities of the observer (e.g.,22–26). The present study extends these results of a role 
of SI in social perception by showing that embodied metaphors such as moral purity are based on somatosensory 
activations in a functional topographic way.
But why are somatosensory brain areas important for embodied metaphors such as moral purity? It has been 
hypothesized that early experiences with the physical world structure our later understanding or representation of 
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Table 2.  Results of random effects analysis for brain responses when rating different set of products after 
lying in a written note and after lying in a voice mail, respectively. Displayed are activations surviving cluster 
level correction (p < 0.05, FWE corrected, threshold of p < 0.005 used to define the clusters, not masked, 
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Table 3.  Results of random effects analysis for brain responses when rating different set of products. 
Displayed are activations surviving cluster level correction (p < 0.05, FWE corrected, threshold of p < 0.005 
used to define the clusters, masked with writing task results, L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere; in 
brackets: uncorrected results).
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bodily sensation. Thereby, the concept formation process or “scaffolding” must be first based on bodily sensations. 
Wilson30 added an evolutionary argument by arguing that we are “evolved from creatures whose neural resources 
were devoted primarily to perceptual and motor processing”.
Figure 5. Statistical maps showing brain activation while participants assessed different sets of products 
after lying in a written note and after lying in a voicemail, respectively. Results demonstrate activations 
in sensorimotor brain areas after lying in a written note only while evaluating hand soaps, not mouthwash 
products. In addition, results show brain activation in sensorimotor cortices after lying in a voice mail only 
during assessment of mouthwash products, not hand soaps. Furthermore, the involvement of the sensorimotor 
cortices is different with respect to the hand and the mouth area of the functional topography in SI.
Figure 6. Scatterplots of BOLD responses in different brain regions while assessment of toothpaste and 
mouthwash relative to soap products after lying in a voicemail. Activity in SI could significantly predict the 
increased desirability of toothpaste and mouthwash products after unethical deeds (r = 0.39). Correlation of 
activity in M1 and BA6 (premotor cortex) failed to reach the level of significance.
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In his neural reuse theory Anderson argues that the cognitive roles played by each region of the brain are vari-
ous31. Brain areas are involved in different neural partnerships depending on tasks and circumstances. According 
to Anderson neural reuse means a form of neuroplasticity in which neural elements originally developed for one 
purpose are put to multiple uses31. His neural reuse theory points to our brains early-evolving capacity for recur-
ring interaction with our environment. Anderson claims that the abstract use of physical concepts (e.g., using 
purity as a metaphor for moral behavior) may be an example of how the brain uses old strategies in new ways. In 
this way, our novel and abstract higher-order cognitive processes may be just recombinations of more simple and 
basic brain processes.
Beyond activation of sensorimotor activations we also found engagement of hippocampus and amygdala accom-
panying the Macbeth effect. These structures are well known to be related to memory functions. More in detail, it 
has been suggested that those memory structures in the medial temporal lobe may bind distributed activated sites 
in the neocortex that represent a whole memory32. A role for memory structures during the Macbeth effect is in 
line with the assumptions of the embodiment theory.
While we found bilateral engagement of the somatosensory cortices for the hand (soap) condition, the verbal 
condition seemed to involve in particular the somatosensory cortex of the left hemisphere. This may be explained 
simply by the fact that we wash both of our hands with soap, but in general brush our teethes only with the dom-
inant (here the right) hand. However, recent studies also draw the attention to a functional asymmetry in the 
somatosensory cortices especially for social tasks33. Therefore, future research is needed to understand the role of 
hemispheric asymmetry in the neural underpinnings of the Macbeth effect.”
Thus, together with the studies by Zhong and Lillenquist1 and Schnall et al.3, the results of our study demonstrate 
that moral judgment can be driven by intuitive and contextual processes rather than reasoning and conscious 
thought3. Our results show that the neural underpinnings of these intuitive processes are in particular the soma-
tosensory cortex, an area that is currently also prominently discussed for social perceptions in general (e.g.,21). We 
conclude that the role of this brain region seems to be more complex than previously thought, possibly playing 
important roles in knowledge acquisition and understanding of others and thereby providing support for the 
neural reuse theory by Anderson31. Hence, our results support the view that the body influences the mind just as 
the mind influences the body.
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